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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that a trust, properly implemented and 
administered, provides a flexible and valuable means of 
safeguarding assets and providing continuity for family assets 
without the disruption that the death of the head of the family 
can cause. Nevertheless, the requirements of the trust concept 
must be more clearly understood than has been the case over the 
last three decades. Attempts to achieve ends which are 
inconsistent with the fundamentals of a valid trust should be 
resisted, however great the commercial pressure to distort them. 
Where possible, existing family trust structures should be
reviewed regularly to ensure that those involved understand what 
is required of a valid trust. While there are ways in which a 
settlor can continue to have some indirect influence over the 
administration of trust assets by trustees, the ultimate control 
must always remain with the trustees. It should be recognised 
that this is so as a matter of substance and not form alone.
Professor Peter Willoughby OBE, JP, LLM, TEP
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The January 1999 issue of Amicus Curiae carried an article by David Winter on 
'The Selection of Arbitrators', to which a response by Dr K V S K Nathan 
('The selection of arbitrators: another view') was published in Issue 17, May 1999. 
The following letter by Charles Molineaux has been received by the editor.
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These articles consider a very important aspect of 
international arbitration. While there are valuable points in 
Dr Nathan's article, two comments are controversial indeed.
First, Mr Winter had made the observation that a most 
important point in relation to the selection of arbitrators is that 
an arbitrator must be 'psychologically comfortable' with parties 
from other countries, understanding their culture and method of 
presentation. This comfort, he suggests, might be evidenced by 
travel and an interest in other cultures.
Surprisingly, Dr Nathan responds by saying that 'most 
Europeans' when they live abroad tend to interface with the 
locals only 'infrequently at formal occasions if at all'. He 
continues: 'Those who have lived abroad can develop a strong 
bias against the indigenous people. Generally they do not trust 
them ... '. Then, escalating the rhetoric, he makes the
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accusation that there is a 'higher standard of proof often 
demanded by international arbitrators from a party and 
witnesses from a developing country'.
Perhaps this charge is too outrageous to warrant discussion. 
On its face it urges that one-time colonial attitudes toward the 
natives are not a thing of the past, but of the present. If it were 
taken seriously, which it should not be, it would mean that the 
growth of international arbitration, to facilitate development and 
trade, is misconceived and based on a false expectation of an 
honourable effort to search for truth and resolve disputes 
according to law.
(As an anecdotal comment, this writer participated in two 
substantial cases just within the past year in which unanimous 
awards in favour of the developing country entities were 
rendered by Western, or first-world-dominated tribunals.)
The other point warranting discussion is the charge by Dr 
Nathan that the use of a list of arbitrators as a basis for tribunal 
selection to be agreed to by both parties (as contrasted with the 
party-appointed arbitrator approach) is 'an attempt to weaken 
the autonomy of the parties'. This is simply silly. The parties are 
free to write up whatever procedure they like. One distinct 
advantage of a list procedure (as set forth, for example, in the 
new international rules of the American Arbitration Association) 
is that both parties have a voice in the selection of all three 
arbitrators. Assuming a carefully-developed list, prepared by the 
arbitral institution or by the parties themselves, and assuming 
that counsel for the parties do their job in vetting that potential 
arbitrator list, this is a procedure which can instil more 
confidence in the parties in the arbitral process generally and in 
the tribunal itself in particular. Nor is there any basis for the 
further charge that a list procedure 'enables the stronger party in 
terms of power and influence to prevail in the selection of 
arbitrators'. How this would happen is not explained.
The list procedure avoids the problem of defining the attitude 
of the party-appointed arbitrator (i.e. is he to be truly neutral or 
a second-tier advocate for the party appointing him?), avoids the 
problem of the proper scope of the 'interview' or 'beauty 
contest' conducted by the party to select the party-appointed 
arbitrator, and avoids the possibility of leaks, or the suspicion of 
leaks, to the appointer during the process. ®
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